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Abstract In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete
markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are
determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially “arbi-
trage state(s)”, namely, the state(s) which would grant the agent an arbitrage, if
realizable.
Keywords Arbitrage · Incomplete markets · Asymmetric information ·
Information revealed by prices
JEL Classification Number D52
1 Introduction
In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, will
agents be able to learn from prices about their partners’ private information when
they have no prior “model” or “expectations” of how equilibrium prices are deter-
mined? This paper, which complements an earlier one on arbitrage and price rev-
elation under asymmetric information (Cornet and De Boisdeffre 2002), answers
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positively and introduces a sequential and decentralized process of inferences,
where agents learn from prices by analyzing arbitrage opportunities on financial
markets. Refinement of information is then achieved in a decentralized manner by
each agent eliminating sequentially her “arbitrage state(s)”, namely, the state(s)
which would grant the agent an arbitrage, if realizable. The paper also shows
that a coarse refinement of information, which precludes arbitrage, may always
be attained, alternatively, in a decentralized way through prices, or by a similar
sequential elimination process when no price is given.
Section 2 presents the framework and recalls the basic concepts of informa-
tion structures, refinements and arbitrage with asymmetric information. Section 3
introduces the “no-arbitrage principle”, by which agents who only know their own
characteristics may refine their information in successive steps, by eliminating
“arbitrage state(s)”. Section 4 defines a concept of no-arbitrage prices with asym-
metric information and explains how such prices may reveal information. Section 5
describes the refinement process without prices.
2 The model
We consider the basic model of a two time-period economy with private informa-
tion and nominal assets: the simplest tractable model which allows us to present
arbitrage. The economy is finite, in the sense that there are finite sets I , S, and J ,
respectively, of consumers, states of nature, and nominal assets.
In what follows, the first period will also be referred to as t = 0 and the second
period, as t = 1. There is an a priori uncertainty at the first period (t = 0) about
which of the states of nature s ∈ S will prevail at the second period (t = 1). The
non-random state at the first period is denoted by s = 0 and if  ⊂ S, ′ will
stand for {0} ∪ .
Agents may operate financial transfers across states in S′ (i.e., across the two
periods and across the states of the second period) by exchanging a finite number
of nominal assets j ∈ J , which define the financial structure of the model. The
nominal assets are traded at the first period (t = 0) and yield payoffs at the second
period (t = 1), contingent on the realization of the state of nature. We denote by
V js the payoff of asset j ∈ J , when state s ∈ S is realized, by V the S × J -return
matrix V := (V js ), which does not depend upon the asset price q ∈ RJ , and by
V [s] its row vector in state s (for each s ∈ S). A portfolio z = (z j ) ∈ RJ specifies
the quantities |z j | ( j ∈ J ) of each asset j (with the convention that it is bought if
z j > 0 and sold if z j < 0) and V z is thus its financial return across states at time
t = 1.
At the first period, each agent i ∈ I has some private information Si ⊂ S about
which states of the world may occur at the next period: either this information is
kept, or it is possible to infer that the true state will be in a smaller set i ⊂ Si .
In both cases, agents are assumed to receive no wrong information signal, that is,
the true state always belongs to the set ∩i∈I Si or ∩i∈I i , hence assumed to be
non-empty. A collection (Si )i∈I of subsets of S, such that ∩i∈I Si = ∅, is called
an (information) structure and a structure (i ), such that i ⊂ Si for every i , is
called a refinement of (Si ).
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We summarise by [(I, S, J ), V, (Si )i∈I ] the financial and information charac-
teristics of the economy, which are fixed throughout the paper and referred to as
the (financial and information) structure.
We recall the following standard definitions.
Given the return matrix V and a nonempty set  ⊂ S, the price q ∈ RJ is
said to be a no-arbitrage price for the couple (V, ), or the couple (V, ) to be
q-arbitrage-free, if one of the following equivalent assertions, (i) or (ii), holds:
(i) there is no portfolio z ∈ RJ such that −q · z ≥ 0 and V [s] · z ≥ 0 for every
s ∈ , with at least one strict inequality;
(ii) there exists λ = (λ(s)) ∈ R++, such that q =
∑
s∈ λ(s)V [s].
We denote by Q[V, ] the set of no-arbitrage prices associated to (V, ). By
convention, we shall also say that the couple (V,∅) is q-arbitrage-free for every
q ∈ RJ , that is, we let Q[V,∅] = RJ .
3 Sequential elimination of arbitrage states
Given V , a nonempty subset  of S and q ∈ RJ , we now define the sets:
A(V, , q) := {˜s ∈  : ∃z ∈ RJ ,−q · z ≥ 0, V [˜s] · z > 0, V [s] · z
≥ 0,∀ s ∈ }
S1(V, , q) := \A(V, , q),
with the convention that A(V,∅, q) := ∅ and S1(V,∅, q) := ∅, for all q ∈ RJ .
Given V and an information structure (Si ), the set A(V, Si , q) consists in the
so-called “arbitrage state(s)” (of the second period t = 1), that is, states which
grant agent i an arbitrage when his beliefs are represented by the set Si . The first
stage of elimination of arbitrage states leads to the set S1(V, Si , q). However, the
refined set S1(V, Si , q) may display new arbitrage states, that is, there may exist
states s ∈ A(V, S1(V, Si , q), q) such that s /∈ A(V, Si , q). Thus, the elimination
process may need to carry on. It is defined sequentially, hereafter, in two slightly
different ways, which will be shown to be equivalent.
Given V , an agent i with (nonempty) private information set Si ⊂ S, we define,
by induction on k ∈ N and for every q ∈ RJ , the sets Ski (q) as follows:
S0i (q) = Si , and for k ≥ 1
Sk+1i (q) = S1(V, Ski (q), q) := Ski (q)\A(V, Ski (q), q).
Similarly, we define by induction on k ∈ N, the sets S′ki (q) as follows:
S′0i (q) = Si , and for k ≥ 1
S′k+1i (q) =
{
S′ki (q), if A(V, S′ki (q), q) = ∅,
S′ki (q)\{sk} for some sk ∈ A(V, S′ki (q), q) if A(V, S′ki (q), q) = ∅.
The two sequences of finite sets (Ski (q))k∈N and (S′ki (q))k∈N are decreasing, that
is, Sk+1i (q) ⊂ Ski (q) and S′k+1i (q) ⊂ S′ki (q) for every k. Hence, they must be
constant for k large enough and we let:
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S∗i (q) := ∩k∈N Ski (q) (in fact equal to Sk
∗
i (q) for some k
∗ large enough);
S∗∗i (q) := ∩k∈N S′ki (q) (in fact equal to S′k
∗∗
i (q) for some k
∗∗ large enough).
The following result shows that for every price q , the successive elimination of
arbitrage states leads agents to infer the same information sets, whether they rule
out the states of arbitrage one by one (and then, whatever the chronology of infer-
ences), or in bundles.
Theorem 1 Let [V, (Si )] be a given structure and let q ∈ RJ . Then, for every
i ∈ I , S∗i (q) = S∗∗i (q), and this set is the (possibly empty) greatest subset
 of Si such that A(V, , q) = ∅.
The successive elimination of arbitrage states, may be interpreted as a rational
behavior. This behavior, referred to as the “no-arbitrage principle”, does not require
any knowledge of the ex ante characteristics of the economy (endowments and pref-
erences of the other consumers) or of a relationship between prices and the private
information of other agents. This is the main difference between our model of
asymmetric information and that of rational expectations.
We prepare the proof of Theorem 1 with two claims.
Claim 1 Given q ∈ RJ and 1 ⊂ 2 ⊂ S, then, S1(V, 1, q) ⊂ S1(V, 2, q).
Proof of Claim 1 By contraposition. Suppose that there exists some s˜ ∈ S1
(V, 1, q) ⊂ 1 ⊂ 2, such that s˜ /∈ S1(V, 2, q). Then, s˜ ∈ A(V, 2, q),
that is, there exists z ∈ RJ such that −q · z ≥ 0, V [s] · z ≥ 0 for every s ∈ 2
and V [s˜] · z > 0. Since s˜ ∈ 1 ⊂ 2, we deduce that s˜ ∈ A(V, 1, q), which
contradicts the fact that s˜ ∈ S1(V, 1, q). unionsq
Claim 2 For every  ⊂ Si , such that A(V, , q) = ∅, and every k ∈ N, the
following inclusions hold:  ⊂ Ski (q) ⊂ S′ki (q).
Proof of Claim 2 By induction on k. The above inclusions are true for k = 0,
since S0i (q) = S′0i (q) := Si . Assume now that the inclusions hold up to rank k.
Let  ⊂ Si be such that A(V, , q) = ∅. Then, from Claim 1:
S1(V, , q) ⊂ S1(V, Ski (q), q) ⊂ S1(V, S′ki (q), q).
Since A(V, , q) = ∅, we deduce that S1(V, , q) =  and, from the
definitions of Ski (q) and S
′k
i (q), that S
k+1
i (q) := S1(V, Ski (q), q) and S1(V, S′ki (q),
q) := S′ki (q)\A(V, S′ki (q), q) ⊂ S′k+1i (q). Consequently,  ⊂ Sk+1i (q) ⊂
S′k+1i (q). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1 Let i ∈ I and  ⊂ Si be such that A(V, , q) = ∅. Taking
k large enough yields, from Claim 2:  ⊂ S∗i (q) ⊂ S∗∗i (q) . We deduce from
the definitions of S∗i (q) and S∗∗i (q) that A(V, S∗i (q), q) = A(V, S∗∗i (q), q) = ∅.
These relations imply, first, that S∗i (q) = S∗∗i (q) (take  = S∗∗i (q) above) and,
second, that S∗i (q) = S∗∗i (q) is the greatest element (for the inclusion) among the
subsets  of Si , such that A(V, , q) = ∅. unionsq
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4 Sequential procedures and price revelation
Given the structure [V, (i )], Theorem 1 shows the existence of a unique set,
denoted S˜i (q), which is the greatest subset  of Si such that A(V, , q) = ∅. This
section will compare the sets S˜i (q) and Si (q), the information set revealed to agent
i by the price q ∈ RJ , which was introduced in Cornet-De Boisdeffre (2002). We
recall that Si (q) is the unique (possibly empty) subset of Si , which is the greatest
subset of Si that is q-arbitrage-free. It is immediate to see that Si (q) ⊂ S˜i (q) and
that both sets may be empty.
For arbitrary prices, the families (Si (q)), (S˜i (q)) may not be information
structures, that is, one may have ∩i Si (q) = ∅ or ∩i S˜i (q) = ∅. To get infor-
mation structures, we now need to consider no-arbitrage prices, as in Cornet-De
Boisdeffre (2002), and we recall the following definitions. Given the structure
[V, (i )], the price q ∈ RJ is said to be a no-arbitrage price for agent i if it is
a no-arbitrage price for the couple (V, i ), and a common no-arbitrage price of
the structure [V, (i )] if it is a no-arbitrage price for every agent i ∈ I , that is,
if it belongs to the set Qc[V, (i )] = ∩i Q[V, i ]. Alternatively, the structure
[V, (i )] is said to be arbitrage-free (resp. q-arbitrage-free) if it admits a common
no-arbitrage price, that is, if Qc[V, (i )] = ∅ (resp. q ∈ Qc[V, (i )]). The price
q ∈ RJ is said to be a no-arbitrage price of [V, (Si )] if q is a common no-arbitrage
price for some information structure (i ) refining (Si ). We denote by Q[V, (Si )]
the set of no-arbitrage prices of the structure [V, (Si )].
Theorem 2 Let [V, (Si )] be a given structure. Then, for every q ∈ Q[V, (Si )] and
every i ∈ I , Si (q) = S˜i (q) = S∗i (q) = S∗∗i (q).
The proof of Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and the following
proposition, which is also of interest for itself.
Proposition 1 Given a structure [V, (Si )] and a price q ∈ RJ , the following three
conditions are equivalent:
(i) q is a no-arbitrage price, that is, q ∈ Q[V, (Si )];
(ii) (Si (q)) is an information structure, (i.e., ∩i Si (q) = ∅);
(iii) (S˜i (q)) is an information structure (i.e., ∩i S˜i (q) = ∅), and S˜i (q) is
q-arbitrage-free for every agent i at the first period (t = 0), in the sense
that there is no portfolio z ∈ RJ such that −q · z > 0, V [s] · z ≥ 0 for
every s ∈ S˜i (q).
Moreover, if one of the above conditions holds, Si (q) = S˜i (q) for every i .
Proof The equivalence [(i) ⇔ (ii)] is proved in Cornet and De Boisdeffre (2002).
[(ii) ⇒ (iii)] From (ii) we first deduce that ∅ = ∩i Si (q) ⊂ ∩i S˜i (q). Since
Si (q) = ∅, from the definition, q ∈ Q[V, Si (q)]. This implies q ∈ Q[V, S˜i (q)],
since Si (q) ⊂ S˜i (q). Hence S˜i (q) is q-arbitrage-free at t = 0.
[(iii) ⇒ (ii)] It is clearly sufficient to show that Si (q) = S˜i (q) for every i . Let
i ∈ I be given. By definition of S˜i (q), for every s˜ ∈ S˜i (q), there is no z ∈ RJ
such that −q · z ≥ 0, V [s] · z ≥ 0, for every s ∈ S˜i (q), and V [s˜] · z > 0. That
condition, together with the fact that S˜ j (q) is q-arbitrage free for every agent j ∈ I
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at the first period, implies that S˜i (q) is q-arbitrage-free for agent i . Consequently,
S˜i (q) ⊂ Si (q), from the definition of Si (q), whereas the inclusion Si (q) ⊂ S˜i (q)
is immediate. Hence, Si (q) = S˜i (q). This completes the proof. unionsq
We point out that the above assertions (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 may not be
equivalent if we do not assume in (iii) that S˜i (q) is q-arbitrage free for every agent
i at the first period, as shown by the following counter-example.
Example Consider two agents, five states (S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), private information
sets S1 = {1, 2, 3, 5}, S2 = {1, 4, 5}, and the payoff matrix:
V =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
−1 0 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
Then, for q = (1, 1, 0), S1(q) = S˜1(q) = {2, 5} , S2(q) = ∅, while S˜2(q) = {4, 5}.
Thus, ∅ = S1(q) ∩ S2(q) ⊂ S˜1(q) ∩ S˜2(q) = {5}.
5 Reaching the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement
We denote by S the set of arbitrage-free refinements of (Si ) . Given the structure
[V, (Si )], we recall that there exists a unique coarsest element in S, denoted by
(Si [V, (Si )]) or simply (Si ) when no confusion is possible, that is (Si ) ∈ S and
(i ) ∈ S implies i ⊂ Si , for every i . We refer to (Cornet and De Boisdeffre
2002) for this definition and, also, below for an alternative proof of the existence
of (Si ).
The purpose of this section is to provide an alternative process of inferences,
which does not rely on prices and leads agents to infer the coarsest refinement (Si )
of (Si ). Thus, given the structure [V, (Si )] and a refinement (i ) of (Si ), we let,
for each i ∈ I :
Ai (V, (i )) := {˜si ∈ i : ∃(z j ) ∈ (RJ )I , such that V [˜si ] · zi > 0,
∑
j∈I
z j = 0
and V [s j ] · z j ≥ 0,∀ j ∈ I,∀s j ∈  j };
S1i (V, (i )) := i\Ai (V, (i )).
Then, we define, similarly as in the previous section, two alternative inference
processes, by induction on the integer k ∈ N. Namely, for each i ∈ I , we let:
S0i := Si , and, for every k ≥ 0, Sk+1i := S1i (V, (Ski ));
similarly, we let:
S
′0
i := Si , and, for every k ≥ 0,
S
′k+1
i :=
{
S′ki , if Ai (V, (S
′k
i )) = ∅, and, otherwise,
S′ki \{ski }, for some arbitrary ski ∈ Ai (V, (S′ki )) = ∅
}
Again, both sequences (Ski )k and (S
′k
i )k are decreasing in the finite set Si , hence,
constant for k large enough. We denote their limits by (S∗i ) and (S∗∗i ).
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Theorem 3 Let [V, (Si )] be a given structure. Then, for every i ∈ I , S∗i = S∗∗i
and (S∗i ) is the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement of (Si ).
The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to that of Theorem 1 and left to readers.
Again, Theorem 3 shows that the chronology of all agents’ inferences will not
change the outcome. Whatever the individual paths of inferences, they always lead
to the same limit, namely the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement (Si ).
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